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February 19, 2018 37 
The UN Paris Agreement1 includes a long-term climate goal with two levels of global mean 38 
temperature anomalies (1.5°C and 2°C global mean warming above pre-industrial times). 39 
However, it does not precisely define what a “1.5°C warmer world” would be like. Here we show 40 
that alternative “1.5°C warmer worlds” associated with different temporal and spatial dimensions 41 
of changes, climate variability (climate noise), model uncertainty, and mitigation and adaptation 42 
choices, overlaid on anticipated and differential vulnerabilities, can be vastly different at regional 43 
scales. Different global and regional climate sensitivities, as well as overshooting, mean that 44 
pursuing stringent 1.5°C climate mitigation will not completely remove the risk of global 45 
temperatures being much higher, and regional extremes reaching dangerous levels for ecosystems 46 
and society over the coming decades. 47 
 48 
Since 2010, international climate policy under the United Nations moved the public discourse from a 49 
focus on atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases to a focus on distinct global temperature 50 
targets above the pre-industrial period1,2. In 2015, this led to the inclusion of a long-term 51 
temperature goal in the Paris Agreement that makes reference to two levels of global mean 52 
temperature increase: 1.5°C and 2°C. The former is set as an ideal aim (“pursuing efforts to limit the 53 
temperature increase to 1.5°C”) and the latter is set as an upper bound (“well below 2°C”)1. This 54 
change in emphasis allows a better link between mitigation targets and the required level of 55 
adaptation ambition3,4.  56 
 57 
Assessing the effects of the reduction of anthropogenic forcing through a single qualifier, namely 58 
global mean temperature change compared with the pre-industrial climate, however, also entails 59 
risks. This deceivingly simple characterization may lead to an oversimplified perception of human-60 
induced climate change and of the potential pathways to limit impacts of greenhouse gas forcing. 61 
We highlight here the multiple ways in which a 1.5°C global warming may be realized. These 62 
alternative “1.5°C warmer worlds” are related to a) the temporal and regional dimension of 1.5°C 63 
pathways, b) model-based spread in regional climate responses, c) climate noise, d) and ranges of 64 
possible options for mitigation and adaptation. We also highlight potential high-risk temperature 65 
outcomes of mitigation pathways currently considered consistent with 1.5°C due to uncertainties in 66 
relating greenhouse gas emissions to subsequent global warming, and to uncertainties in associated 67 
regional climate changes. 68 
 69 
Definition of a “1.5°C warming” 70 
Global mean temperature is a construct: It is the globally averaged temperature of the Earth that 71 
can be derived from point-scale ground observations or computed in climate models. Global mean 72 
temperature is defined over a given time frame (e.g. averaged over a month, a year, or multiple 73 
decades). As a result of climate variability, which is due to internal variations of the climate system 74 
and temporary naturally-induced forcings (e.g. from volcanic eruptions), a climate-based global 75 
mean temperature typically needs to be defined over several decades (at least 30 years under the 76 
definition of the World Meteorological Organization)5. Hence, to determine a 1.5°C global 77 
temperature warming, one needs to agree on a reference period (assumed here to be 1850-1900 78 
inclusive, unless otherwise indicated), and on a time frame over which a 1.5°C mean global warming 79 
is observed (assumed here to be of the order of one to several decades). Comparisons of global 80 
mean temperatures from models and observations are also not straightforward: Not all points over 81 
the Earth’s surface are continuously observed, leading to methodological choices about how to deal 82 
with data gaps6 and the mixture of air temperature over land and water temperatures over oceans7 83 
when comparing full-field climate models with observational products.  84 
 85 
 86 
Temporal and spatial dimensions 87 
There are two important temporal dimensions of 1.5°C warmer worlds: a) the time period over 88 
which the 1.5°C warmer climate is assessed; and b) the pathway followed prior to reaching this 89 
temperature level, in particular whether global mean temperature returns to the 1.5°C level after 90 
previously exceeding it for some time (also referred to as “overshooting”, Figure 1a). As highlighted 91 
hereafter, for some components of the coupled Human-Earth system, there are substantial 92 
differences in risks between 1.5°C of warming in the year 2040, 1.5°C of warming in 2100 either with 93 
or without earlier overshooting, and 1.5°C warming after several millennia at this warming level. 94 
The time period over which 1.5°C warming is reached is relevant because some slow-varying 95 
elements of the climate system respond with a delay to radiative forcing, and the resulting 96 
temperature anomalies. Hence their status will change over time, even if the warming is stabilized at 97 
1.5°C over several decades, centuries, or millennia. This is the case with the melting of glaciers, ice 98 
caps and ice sheets and their contribution to future sea level rise, as well as the warming and 99 
expansion of the oceans, so that a substantial component of contemporary sea-level rise is a 100 
response to past warming. In addition, the rate of warming is also an important element of imposed 101 
stress for resulting risks, because it may affect adaptation or lack thereof8,9,10. For example, the 102 
faster the rate of change the fewer taxa (and hence ecosystems) can disperse naturally to track their 103 
climate envelope across the Earth’s surface8,11. Similarly, in human systems, faster rates of change in 104 
climate variables such as sea level rise present increasing challenges to adaptation to the point 105 
where attempts may be increasingly overwhelmed.  106 
Whether mean global temperature temporarily overshoots the 1.5°C limit is another important 107 
consideration. All currently available mitigation pathways projecting less than 1.5°C global warming 108 
by 2100 include some probability of overshooting this temperature, with some time period during 109 
the 21st century in which warming higher than 1.5°C is projected with greater than 50% 110 
probability12,13,14,15. This is inherent to the difficulty of limiting warming to 1.5°C given that the Earth 111 
at present is already very close to this warming level (ca. 1°C warming for the current time frame 112 
relative to 1851-190016). The implications of overshooting are very important for projecting future 113 
risks and for considering potentially long-lasting and irreversible impacts in the time frame of the 114 
current century and beyond, for instance associated with ice melting17 and associated sea level rise, 115 
loss of ecosystem functionality and increased risks of species extinction11, or loss of livelihoods, 116 
identity, and sense of place and belonging18. Overshooting might cause the temporary exceedance 117 
of some thresholds for example in ecosystems, which might be sufficient to cause permanent loss of 118 
these systems; or, those systems and species able to adapt rapidly enough to cope with a particular 119 
rate of change would be faced with the challenge of adapting again to a lower level of warming post-120 
overshoot. The chronology of emission pathways and their implied warming is also important for the 121 
more slowly evolving parts of the Earth system, such as those associated with sea level rise (see 122 
above).   123 
On the other hand, to minimize the duration and magnitude of the exceedance above a 1.5°C level 124 
of warming (overshooting), the remaining carbon budget available for emissions is very small, 125 
implying that deeper global mitigation efforts are required immediately (next section; see also Table 126 
1 and Box 1).  127 
The spatial dimension of 1.5°C warmer worlds is also important. Two worlds with similar global 128 
mean temperature anomalies may be associated with very different risks depending on how the 129 
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associated regional temperature anomalies are distributed (Fig. 1b). Differential geographical 130 
responses in temperature are induced by: a) spatially varying radiative forcing (e.g. associated with 131 
land use19,20,21 or aerosols22; b) differential regional feedbacks to the applied radiative forcing (e.g. 132 
associated with soil moisture-, snow, or ice feedbacks4,23); and/or c) regional climate noise24 (e.g. 133 
associated with modes of variability or atmospheric weather variability). Similar considerations apply 134 
to regional changes in precipitation means and extremes, which are not globally homogeneous3,4.   135 
These regional temperature and precipitation anomalies and their rates of change determine the 136 
regional risks to human and natural systems and the challenges to adaptation which they face. 137 
We note that mitigation, adaptation, and development pathways may result in spatially varying 138 
radiative forcing. While greenhouse gases are well mixed, changes in land use or air pollution may 139 
strongly affect regional climate. Land-use changes can be associated, for example, with the 140 
implementation of increased bioenergy plantations25, afforestation, reforestation, or deforestation, 141 
and their resulting impacts on local albedo or evapotranspiration; levels of aerosol concentrations 142 
may vary as a result of decreased air pollution22. Considering these regional forcings is essential 143 
when evaluating regional impacts, although there is still little available literature for 1.5°C warmer 144 
worlds, or low-emissions scenarios in general22,26,27,28. The spatial dimension of regional climates 145 
associated with a global warming of 1.5°C is also crucial when assessing risks associated with 146 
proposed climate engineering schemes based on solar radiation management (see hereafter). Beside 147 
the geographical distribution of changes in climate, non-temperature related changes are important, 148 
particularly where atmospheric CO2 has additional and serious impacts through phenomena such as 149 
ocean acidification. 150 
 151 
Uncertainties of emissions pathways  152 
Emissions pathways that are currently considered to be compatible with limiting global warming to 153 
1.5°C12,13,14,15 are selected based on their probability of limiting warming to below 1.5°C by 2100 154 
given current knowledge of how the climate system is likely to respond. Typically, this probability is 155 
set at 50% or 66% (i.e. 1/2 or 2/3 chances, respectively, of limiting warming in 2100 to 1.5°C or 156 
lower). The adequacy of these levels of probability is rather a political than a scientific question. This 157 
implies that even when diligently following such 1.5°C pathways from today onwards, there is 158 
considerable probability that the 1.5°C limit will be exceeded. This also includes some possibilities of 159 
warming being substantially higher than 1.5°C (see hereafter for the 10% worst-case scenarios). 160 
These risks of alternative climate outcomes are not negligible and need to be factored into the 161 
decision-making process.  162 
Table 1 provides an overview of the outcomes of emissions pathways that are currently considered 163 
1.5°C- and 2°C-compatible with a specific probability15 (and broadly consistent with the literature 164 
assessed in the IPCC AR512,14, see Box 1 and Supplementary Information). Both “probable” (66th 165 
percentile, which remains below the respective temperature targets) and “worst-case” (10% worst, 166 
i.e. high-end) outcomes of these pathways are presented, including resulting global temperatures 167 
and regional climate changes (see next section and Box 1 for details, and Supplementary Information 168 
for median outcomes). The reported net cumulative CO2 emissions characteristics for these scenario 169 
categories include effects of carbon dioxide removal options (CDR, also termed “negative 170 
emissions”29), which explains the decrease in cumulative CO2 budgets after peak warming. Possible 171 
proposed CDR approaches include bioenergy use with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) or 172 
afforestation and changes in agricultural practice increasing carbon sequestration on land29. We note 173 
that the use of these approaches is controversial and could entail own sets of risks, for instance 174 
related to competition for land use30,31. Their implementation is at present also still very limited, and 175 
the feasibility of their deployment as simulated in low-emissions scenarios has been questioned32. 176 
Current publications12,14,15 indicate that scenarios in line with limiting year-2100 warming to below 177 
1.5°C require strong and immediate mitigation measures and would require some degree and some 178 
kind of CDR. Alternative scenario configurations can be considered to limit the amount of CDR32. The 179 
current scenarios15 as well as recent publications33,34,35 provide updated cumulative CO2 budgets 180 
estimates, which have larger remaining budgets compared to earlier estimates12,14. These, however, 181 
do not fundamentally change the need for strong near-term mitigation measures and technologies 182 
capable of enabling net-zero global CO2 emissions near to mid-century if the considered emissions 183 
pathways are to be followed. 184 
 185 
Global and regional climate responses  186 
Considering a subset of regions and extremes shown to retain particularly strong changes under a 187 
global warming of 1.5°C or 2°C4,36, Table 1 provides corresponding regional responses for the 188 
evaluated 1.5°C- and 2°C-compatible emissions pathways. The Figures 2 and 3 display associated 189 
regional changes for a subset of considered extremes: temperature extremes (coldest nights in the 190 
Arctic, warmest days in the contiguous United States) and in heavy precipitation (consecutive 5-day 191 
maximum precipitation in Southern Asia). Changes in hot extremes in Central Brazil and in drought 192 
occurrence in the Mediterranean region are additionally provided in Table 1. We note that the 193 
spread displayed for single scenario subsets in Figures 2 and 3 correspond to the spread of the global 194 
climate simulations of the 5th phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP5) 195 
underlying the derivation of the regional extremes for given global temperature levels4,36 (see Box 1 196 
for details). 197 
In terms of the resulting global mean temperature increase, Figure 2 shows that the difference 198 
between the 10% “worst-case” and the “probable” (66%) outcome of the scenarios is substantial, 199 
both for the 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios. Interestingly, the “worst-case” outcomes from the 1.5°C 200 
scenarios are similar to the probable outcome of the 2°C scenarios. Indeed, both of these show less 201 
than 2°C warming by 2100, and approximately 2°C in the overshoot phase, while the warming in the 202 
overshoot phase can be slightly higher for the “worst-case” 1.5°C than for the probable 2°C 203 
scenarios assessed here. Hence, the scenarios aiming at limiting global warming to 1.5°C also have a 204 
clear relevance for limiting global warming to 2°C13, in that they ensure the 2°C threshold is not 205 
exceeded at the end of the 21st century. This contrasts with pathways designed to keep warming to 206 
2°C, but have a 10% high-end (“worst-case”) warming of more than 2.4°C. This result is important 207 
when considering a 2°C warming as a “defence line” that should not be exceeded2. 208 
Assessing changes in regional extremes illustrate the importance of considering the geographical 209 
distribution of climate change in addition to the global mean warming. Indeed, the average global 210 
warming does not convey the level of regional variability in climate responses4. By definition, 211 
because the global mean temperature is an average in time and space, there will be locations and 212 
time periods in which 1.5°C warming is exceeded even if the global mean temperature rise is 213 
restrained to 1.5°C. This is even already the case today, at about 1°C of global warming compared to 214 
the preindustrial period16. Similarly, some locations and time frames will display less warming than 215 
the global mean. 216 
Extremes at regional scales can warm much more strongly than the global mean. For example, in 217 
scenarios compatible with 1.5°C global warming, minimum night-time temperatures (TNn) in the 218 
Arctic increase by up to 5°C at peak warming if the “probable” (66th percentile) outcome of scenarios 219 
materializes, and up to 7°C if the “worst-case” (highest 10%, i.e. 90th percentile) outcome of the 220 
scenarios materializes (Fig. 2). For the “worst-case” outcome of scenarios considered 2°C 221 
compatible, the changes in these cold extremes is even larger, and can reach more than 8°C at peak 222 
warming (Fig. 2). While the change is more limited for hot extremes (annual maximum mid-day 223 
temperature, TXx) in the contiguous United States, it is also substantial there. At peak warming, 224 
these hot extremes increase by about 2.5°C for the probable 1.5°C scenarios (maximum in 66% of 225 
the cases), and exceeds 3°C warming for the “worst-case” 1.5°C scenarios and some of the 226 
“probable” 2°C scenarios. If the 10% “worst-case” temperature outcome materializes after following 227 
a pathway considered 2°C-compatible today, the temperature increase of the hottest days (TXx) can 228 
reach almost 4°C at peak global warming in that region (Fig. 2).  229 
These analyses also reveal the level of inter-model range in regional responses, when comparing the 230 
full spread of the CMIP5 distributions (Fig. 2). This interquartile range reaches about 2°C for TNn in 231 
the Arctic and 1°C for TXx in the contiguous US at peak warming, i.e. it is 2-4 times larger than the 232 
difference in global warming at 1.5°C vs 2°C. The intermodel range is also very large for changes in 233 
heavy precipitation in Southern Asia (Fig. 2), with an approximate doubling of the response at peak 234 
warming for the 75th quantile in the most sensitive models compared to the 25th quantile in the least 235 
sensitive models. This highlights the fact that uncertainty in regional sensitivity to given global 236 
warming levels is an important component of uncertainty in impact projections (similarly as 237 
uncertainty in mitigation pathways or the global transient climate response). It also shows that even 238 
under most stringent mitigation pathways, some risk of dangerous changes in regional extremes (i.e. 239 
equivalent or stronger than responses at 2°C global warming) cannot be excluded. 240 
Whilst most climate change risk assessments factor in the inter-model range of regional climate 241 
responses, relatively few consider the effects of extreme weather, for example the temperature 242 
increase of hottest days (TXx). Emerging literature highlights how these extreme events strongly 243 
influence levels of risk to human and natural systems, including crop yields37 and biodiversity38, 244 
suggesting that the majority of risk assessments based on mean regional climate changes alone are 245 
conservative in that they do not incorporate the effects of extreme weather events. In addition, the 246 
co-occurrence of extreme events is also of high relevance for accurately assessing changes in risk, 247 
although analyses in this area are still lacking39,40. 248 
Hence, the regional analyses of changes in extremes for scenarios aiming at limiting warming to 249 
1.5°C and 2°C highlight the following main findings: 250 
- Some regional responses of temperature extremes will be much larger than the changes in 251 
global mean temperature, with a factor of up to 3 (TNn in the Arctic). 252 
- The regional responses at peak warming for scenarios that are considered today as 253 
compatible with limiting warming to 1.5°C (i.e. having 66% chance of stabilizing at 1.5°C by 254 
2100) can still involve an extremely large increase in temperature in some locations and time 255 
frames, in the worst case up to 7°C for extreme cold night time temperatures or more than 256 
3°C for daytime hot extremes (Fig. 2). 257 
- The 10% highest response (“worst-case”) temperature outcome of pathways currently 258 
considered compatible with 1.5°C warming is comparable with the 66th percentile outcomes 259 
(“probable”) of scenarios that are considered for limiting warming below 2°C, at global and 260 
regional scales. This indicates that pursuing a 1.5°C compatible pathway can be considered a 261 
high-probability 2°C pathway13 that strongly increases the probability of avoiding the risks of 262 
a 2°C warmer world.  263 
 264 
Realization at single locations and times 265 
The analyses of Figs. 2 and 3 represent the statistical response over longer time frames. Several 266 
dominant patterns of response are documented in the literature4, for instance that land 267 
temperatures tend to warm more than global mean temperature on average, in particular with 268 
respect to hot extremes in transitional regions between dry and wet climates, and coldest days in 269 
high-latitudes (see also Figs. 2 and 3). Nonetheless, due to internal climate variability (and in part 270 
model-based uncertainty), there may be large local departures from this typical response at single 271 
points in time (any given year within a 10-year time frame) as displayed in Fig. 4. Many locations 272 
show a fairly large probability (25% chance) of temperature anomalies below 1.5°C, and in some 273 
cases even smaller anomalies (mostly for the extreme indices). On the other hand, there is a similar 274 
probability (25%, for 75th percentile) that some locations can display temperature increases of more 275 
than 3°C, and in some cases up to 7-9°C for cold extremes. This illustrates that highly unusual and 276 
even unprecedented temperatures may occur even in a 1.5°C climate. While some of the patterns 277 
reflect what is expected from the median response4, the spread of responses is large in most 278 
regions. 279 
 280 
Aspects insufficiently considered so far 281 
The integrated assessment models used to derive the mitigation scenarios discussed here did not 282 
include several feedbacks that are present in the coupled Human-Earth system. This includes, for 283 
example, biogeophysical impacts of land use26,26,27, potential competition for land between negative 284 
emission technologies and agriculture29,31, water availability constraints on energy infrastructure and 285 
bioenergy cropping30,31, regional implications of choices of specific scenarios for tropospheric aerosol 286 
concentrations, or behavioural and societal changes in anticipation of or response to climate 287 
impacts41. For comprehensive assessments of the regional implications of mitigation and adaptation 288 
measures, such aspects of development pathways would need to be factored in.  289 
We note also that non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions have to be reduced jointly with CO2. The 290 
numbers in Table 1 consider budgets for cumulative CO2 emissions taking into account consistent 291 
evolutions for non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions. To compare the temperature outcome of 292 
pathways from many different forcings (e.g. methane, nitrous oxide), a CO2-only emission pathway 293 
that has the same radiative forcing can be found, which is termed CO2-forcing equivalent emissions 294 
(CO2-fe)42,43. Hence stronger modulation in non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions could be considered 295 
in upcoming scenarios. 296 
Furthermore, a continuous adjustment of mitigation responses based on the observed climate 297 
response (that can e.g. reduce present uncertainties regarding the global transient climate response) 298 
might be necessary to avoid undesired outcomes. Pursuing such “adaptive” mitigation scenarios33 299 
would be facilitated by the Global Stocktake mechanism established in the Paris Agreement. 300 
Nonetheless, there are limits to possibilities for the adaptation of mitigation pathways, notably 301 
because some investments (e.g. in infrastructure) are long-term, and also because the actual 302 
departure from a desirable pathway will need to be detected against the backdrop of internal 303 
climate variability. The latter can be large on decadal time scales as highlighted with the recent so-304 
called “hiatus” period44, but its impact can be minimized by using robust estimates of human-305 
induced warming16. Hence, while adaptive mitigation pathways could provide some flexibility to 306 
avoid the highlighted “worst-case” scenarios (Table 1), it is not yet clear to which the extent they 307 
could be implemented in practice. 308 
For a range of indicators, global mean temperature alone is not a sufficient indicator to describe 309 
climate impacts. CO2 – sensitive systems, such as the terrestrial biosphere and agriculture systems, 310 
respond not only the impact of warming but also of increased CO2 concentrations. Although the 311 
potential positive effects of CO2 fertilisation are not well constrained45, it appears that the impacts of 312 
anthropogenic emissions on those systems will depend not only on the warming inferred, but also 313 
on the CO2 concentrations at which these warming levels are reached. Similarly, impacts on marine 314 
ecosystems depend on warming as well as on changes being driven by ocean acidification46.  315 
Impacts on ocean and cryosphere will respond to warming with a substantial time lag. As a 316 
consequence, ice sheet and glacier melting, ocean warming and as a result sea level rise will 317 
continue long after temperatures have peaked47. Large-scale oceanic systems will also continue to 318 
adjust over the coming centuries. One study identified as a result a continued increase of extreme El 319 
Niño frequency in a peak-and-decline scenario48. The imprints on such time-lagged systems for 320 
different 1.5°C worlds are not well constrained at present.  321 
 322 
Assessing solar radiation management (SRM) 323 
Compared to any mitigation options, climate interventions such as global solar radiation 324 
management (SRM) do not intend to reduce atmospheric CO2 concentration per se but solely to limit 325 
global mean warming. Some studies49,50,51 proposed that SRM may be used as a temporary measure 326 
to avoid global mean temperature exceeding 2°C. However, the use of SRM in the context of limiting 327 
temperature overshoot might create a new set of global and regional impacts, and could 328 
substantially modify regional precipitation patterns as compared to a world without SRM52,53. It 329 
would also have a high potential for cross-boundary conflicts because of positive, negative or 330 
undetectable effects on regional climate54, natural ecosystems55 and human settlements. Hence, 331 
while the global mean temperature might be close to a 1.5°C warming, the regional implications 332 
could be very different from those of a 1.5°C global warming reached with early reductions of CO2 333 
emissions and stabilization of CO2 concentrations. In some cases, some novel climate conditions 334 
would be created because of the addition of two climate forcings with different geographical 335 
footprints. Hence, a similar mean global warming may have very different regional implications (see 336 
Fig. 1b for an illustration) and in the case of SRM would be associated with substantial uncertainties 337 
in terms of regional impacts. Furthermore, SRM would not counter ocean acidification, which would 338 
continue unabated under enhanced CO2 concentrations. Finally, there is also the issue that the 339 
sudden discontinuation of SRM measures would lead to a “termination problem”50,56. Together, this 340 
implies that the aggregated environmental implications of an SRM world with 1.5°C mean global 341 
temperature warming, would probably be very different, and likely more detrimental and less 342 
predictable, from those of a 1.5°C warmer world in which the global temperature is limited to 1.5°C 343 
through decarbonisation alone. Nonetheless, regional-scale changes in surface albedo may be 344 
worthwhile considering in order to reduce regional impacts in cities or agricultural areas21, although 345 
in-depth assessments on this topic are not yet available, and such modifications would be unlikely to 346 
substantially affect global temperature.  347 
 348 
 349 
Risks in 1.5°C warmer worlds   350 
 351 
1.5°C warmer worlds will still present risks to natural, managed, and human systems. The magnitude 352 
of these risks and their geographical patterns in a 1.5°C warmer world will not only depend on 353 
uncertainties in the regional climate that result from this level of warming. The magnitude of risk will 354 
also strongly depend on the approaches used to limit warming to 1.5°C and on the wider context of 355 
societal development as it is pursued by individual communities and nations, and global society as a 356 
whole, which will result in significant differences in the magnitude and pattern of exposures and 357 
vulnerabilities57,58.  358 
 359 
For natural ecosystems and agriculture, low-emissions scenarios can have a high reliance on land use 360 
modifications (either for bioenergy production or afforestation25,29,59) that in turn can affect food 361 
production and prices through land use competition effects29,31,60. The risks to human systems will 362 
depend on the ambition and effectiveness of implementing accompanying policies and measures 363 
that increase resilience to the risks of climate change and potential trade-offs of mitigation. For 364 
example, large scale deployment of BECCS could push the Earth closer to the planetary boundaries 365 
for land use change and freshwater, biosphere integrity and biogeochemical flows30.  366 
 367 
Also the timing of when warming can be stabilized to 1.5°C or 2°C will influence exposure and 368 
vulnerability. For example, in a world pursuing a strong sustainable development trajectory, 369 
significant increases in resilience by the end of the century would make the world less vulnerable 370 
overall57. Even under this pathway, rapidly reaching 1.5°C would mean that some regions and sectors 371 
would require additional preparation to manage the hazards created by a changing climate. 372 
 373 
Commonalities of all 1.5°C warmer worlds 374 
Because human-caused warming linked to CO2 emissions is near irreversible for more than 1000 375 
years61,62, the cumulative amount of CO2 emissions is the prime determinant to long-lived 376 
permanent changes in the global mean temperature rise at the Earth’s surface. All 1.5°C stabilization 377 
scenarios require net CO2 emissions to be zero and non-CO2 forcing to be capped to stable levels at 378 
some point61,63,64. This is also the case for stabilization scenarios at higher levels of warming (e.g. at 379 
2°C), the only differences would be the time at which the net CO2 budget is zero, and the cumulative 380 
CO2 emissions emitted until then. Hence, a transition to a decarbonisation of energy use is necessary 381 
in all scenarios.  382 
Article 4 of the Paris Agreement calls for net zero global greenhouse gas emissions to be achieved in 383 
the second half of the 21st century, which most plausibly requires some extent of negative CO2 384 
emissions to compensate for remaining non-CO2 forcing13. The timing of when net zero global 385 
greenhouse gas emissions are achieved strongly determines the peak warming. All published 1.5°C-386 
warming compatible scenarios include CDR to achieve net-zero CO2 emissions, to varying degrees. 387 
CO2-induced warming by 2100 is determined by the difference between the total amount of CO2 388 
generated (which can be reduced by early decarbonisation) and the total amount permanently 389 
stored out of the atmosphere, for example by geological sequestration. Current evidence indicates 390 
that at least some measure of CDR will be required to follow a 1.5°C-compatible emissions 391 
trajectory.  392 
 393 
Towards a sustainable “1.5°C warmer world”  394 
Emissions pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C allow to avoid risks associated with higher 395 
levels of warming, but do not guarantee an absence of climate risks at regional scale, and are also 396 
associated with their own set of risks with respect to the implementation of mitigation technologies, 397 
in particular related to land use changes associated with e.g. BECCS or competition for food 398 
production29,30,31. 399 
Important aspects to consider when pursuing limiting warming to or below a global mean 400 
temperature level relate to how this goal is achieved and to the nature of emerging regional and 401 
sub-regional risks65,66,67. Also relevant are considerations of how the policies influence the resilience 402 
of human and natural systems, and which broader societal pathways are followed in terms of human 403 
development. Many but not all of these can be influenced directly through policy choices65,66,67. 404 
Internal climate variability as well as regional climate sensitivity, which display a substantial range 405 
between current climate models, are also important components of how risk will be realized. 406 
Explicitly illustrating the full range of possible outcomes of 1.5°C warmer worlds is important for an 407 
adequate consideration of the implications of mitigation options by decision makers.  408 
The time frame to initiate major mitigation measures varies in 1.5°C-compatible (or 2°C) scenarios 409 
(Table 1). However, given the current state of knowledge about both the global and regional climate 410 
responses and the availability of mitigation measures, if the potential to limit warming to below 411 
1.5°C or 2°C is to be maximised, emissions reductions in CO2 and other greenhouse gases would 412 
need to start as soon as possible, leading to a global decline in emissions following 2020 at the 413 
latest. At the same time, if potential competition for land and water between negative emission 414 
technologies, agriculture and biodiversity conservation is to be avoided, mitigation would need to be 415 
carefully designed and regulated to minimise these effects, which could otherwise act to increase 416 
food prices and reduce ecosystem services. The remaining uncertainties underscore the need for 417 
continuous monitoring of not just global mean surface temperature, but also of the deployment and 418 
development of mitigation options, the resulting emissions reductions, and in particular of the 419 
intensity of global and regional climate responses and their sensitivity to climate forcing. As shown 420 
here, together with the overall societal development choices, these various elements strongly co-421 
determine the regional and sectoral magnitudes and patterns of risk at 2°C and 1.5°C global 422 
warming.  423 
References 424 
1. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. 425 
Contribution of Working Group I to2 the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 426 
Climate Change (eds Stocker, T. F. et al.) 3–29 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013). 427 
[UPDATE REFERENCES] 428 
  429 
Acknowledgements 430 
S.I.S. and R.W. acknowledge the European Research Council (ERC) ‘DROUGHT-HEAT’ project funded by the 431 
European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (grant agreement FP7-IDEAS-ERC-617518). J.R. 432 
acknowledges the Oxford Martin School Visiting Fellowship programme for support. R.S. acknowledges the 433 
European Union’s H2020 project CRESCENDO “Coordinated Research in Earth Systems and Climate: 434 
Experiments, kNowledge, Dissemination and Outreach” (grant agreement H2020-641816). O.H.G. 435 
acknowledges support of the Australia Research Council Laureate program. This work contributes to the World 436 
Climate Research Programme (WCRP) Grand Challenge on Extremes. We acknowledge the WCRP Working 437 
Group on Coupled Modelling, which is responsible for CMIP, and we thank the climate modelling groups for 438 
producing and making available their model output. For CMIP the US Department of Energy’s Program for 439 
Climate Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison provides coordinating support and led development of software 440 
infrastructure in partnership with the Global Organization for Earth System Science Portals.  441 
 442 
 443 
 444 
Data availability 445 
Emission data is available from the database accompanying ref15 which presents pathways in line with 1.9 446 
W/m2 of radiative forcing in 2100, limiting warming to below 1.5°C by 2100. Regional changes in climate 447 
extremes for different global warming levels derived following the methodology of refs4,36 can be obtained 448 
from the associated database associated with the ERC DROUGHT-HEAT project (http://www.drought-449 
heat.ethz.ch) and the software developed under ref36. 450 
 451 
 452 
 453 
Authors contributions 454 
 455 
S.I.S. coordinated the design and writing of the article, with inputs from all co-authors. J.R. provided the 456 
emissions scenario data processed in Table 1. R.S. computed the scenario summary statistics of Table 1. R.W. 457 
computed the regional projections statistics of Table 1, as well as Figs. 2-4. J.R., R.S., M.A, M.C and R.M. 458 
provided essential insights on emissions scenarios. S.I.S. prepared Fig. 1, with support from P.T. and J.R. S.I.S. 459 
drafted the first version of the manuscript, with inputs from J.R., R.S. and M.A. All authors contributed to and 460 
commented on the manuscript.   461 
Box 1. Emissions budgets and regional projections for 1.5°C and 2°C global warming 462 
The emissions budget estimates provided in Table 1 are based on scenarios currently considered compatible 463 
with limiting global warming to 1.5°C and 2°C, either in 2100 or during the entire 21st century15. For these 464 
estimates, emissions pathways compatible with a 1.5°C or 2°C global warming are determined based on their 465 
probability of limiting the global temperature anomaly below 1.5°C or 2°C by 2100 using the probabilistic 466 
outcomes of a simple climate model (MAGICC68) exploring the range of climate system response as assessed in 467 
the Working Group I contribution to the IPCC 5th assessment report (IPCC AR5)69.  468 
 469 
The global transient climate response (TCR) values corresponding to the 50th (see Supplementary Information), 470 
66th and 90th percentile (Table 1) responses in the scenarios are 1.7 [°C/ 1000 GtC], 1.9 [°C/1000 GtC], and 2.4 471 
[°C/1000 GtC], overall consistent with the assessed range for this parameter (1-2.5 [°C/1000 GtC]) in the IPCC 472 
AR569. The current airborne fraction (ratio of accumulated atmospheric CO2 to CO2 emissions over the decade 473 
2011-2020) in these scenarios with this version of the MAGICC model is 0.55, which is 20% higher than the 474 
central estimate given in refs70,71, but ref71 emphasises that this quantity is uncertain and subject to variability 475 
over time.  476 
 477 
The provided estimates are consistent with corresponding values derived from scenarios assessed in the 478 
Working Group III contribution to the IPCC AR512,14 (see Suppl. Information), but have slightly larger estimates 479 
for the remaining cumulative CO2 budgets, consistent with other recent publications33,34,35.  Both sets of 480 
scenarios imply that for limiting global temperature warming below 1.5°C by the end of the century strong 481 
near-term mitigation measures are needed supported by technologies capable of enabling net-zero global CO2 482 
emissions near to mid-century. 483 
 484 
Table 1 also provides estimates of regional responses associated with given levels of global temperature 485 
warming (at peak warming and in 2100). The values are computed based on decadal averages of global climate 486 
model simulations from the CMIP5 experiment following the approach from refs4,36. Decades corresponding to 487 
a 1.5°C or 2°C warming are those in which the last year of the decade reaches this temperature, consistent 488 
with previous publications3,4,36. The considered climate extremes indicators include warming of the minimum 489 
annual night-time temperature (TNn) in the Arctic land [°C], the warming of the maximum annual day-time 490 
temperature (TXx) in the contiguous United States [°C], TXx warming in Central Brazil [°C], (soil moisture) 491 
drying in the Mediterranean region [in units of standard deviations of late 20th century variability], and 492 
increases in heavy precipitation events based on annual maximum consecutive 5-day precipitation (Rx5day) in 493 
Southern Asia [%]). See ref4 for a definition of the geographical domains. The estimates are derived from …. 494 
CMIP5 models (see ref36). 495 
 496 
The databases underlying the analyses of Table 1 and Figs. 2-3 are described under the data availability 497 
statement. The R code used to analyze MAGICC outputs in this paper is available from R.S. on reasonable 498 
request. The scripts used for the regional analyses provided in Table 1 and Figs 2-4 are available from S.I.S. and 499 
R.W. upon request. 500 
 501 
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a 66th percentile for global temperature (i.e. 66% likelihood of being at or below threshold) 516 
b 90th percentile for global temperature (i.e. 10% likelihood of being at or above threshold) 517 
c All 1.5°C scenarios include a substantial probability of overshooting above 1.5°C global warming before returning to 1.5°C.  518 
d The values indicate the median and the interquartile range in parenthesis (25th percentile and 75th percentile) 519 
e The regional projections in these rows provide the range [median (q25, q75)] associated with the median global temperature outcomes 520 
of the considered mitigation scenarios at peak warming (see Box 1 for details).  521 
f TNn: annual minimum night-time temperature; TXx: annual maximum day-time temperature; std: drying of soil moisture expressed in 522 
units of standard deviations of late 20th century variability; Rx5day: annual maximum consecutive 5-day precipitation (see Box 1 for 523 
details) 524 
g Same as footnote e, but for the regional responses associated with the median global temperature outcomes of the considered 525 
mitigation scenarios in 2100 (see Box 1 for details). 526 
h
  Red and yellow colors indicate whether scenarios lead to overshoot a given level of warming or not. 527 
i
  Green, yellow and red colors indicate whether the global mean temperature remains below 1.5°C, between 1.5°C and 2°C, or exceeds 528 
2°C.  529 
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Figure 1. Temporal and spatial dimensions 1.5°C warmer worlds. a. Typical pathways of Earth’s climate 532 
towards stabilization at 1.5°C warming. Pre-industrial climate conditions are the reference for the determined 533 
global warming. Present-day warming corresponds to 1°C compared to pre-industrial conditions. All “1.5°C-534 
warming compatible emissions pathways” currently available in the literature12,13,14,15 include overshooting 535 
over 1.5°C warming prior to stabilization or further decline. We here illustrate the example of temperature 536 
stabilization at 1.5°C in the long-term, but temperatures could also further decline below 1.5°C.  b. Not all 537 
conceivable “1.5°C warmer climates” are equivalent. These conceptual schematics illustrate the importance of 538 
the spatial dimension of distributed impacts associated with a given global warming, at the example of a 539 
simplified world with two surfaces of equal area (the given temperature anomalies are chosen for illustrative 540 
purposes and do not refer to specific 1.5°C scenarios). (left) Reference world (without warming); (top right) 541 
world with 1.5°C mean global warming that is equally distributed on the two surfaces; (bottom right) world 542 
with 1.5°C mean global warming with high differences in regional responses. 543 
 544 
Figure 2: Possible outcomes with respect to global temperature and regional climate anomalies from typical 545 
1.5°C-warming and 2°C-warming compatible scenarios at peak warming. Top: Net GtCO2 emitted until time of 546 
peak warming relative to 2016 (including carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere) in considered scenarios 547 
from Table 1 (25thquantile (q25), median (q50), and 75th quantile (q75)). 2nd row: Global mean temperature 548 
anomaly at peak warming (q25, q50, q75). 3rd-5th row: Regional climate anomalies at peak warming compared 549 
to the pre-industrial period corresponding to the median global warming of the 2nd row (full range associated 550 
with different regional responses within CMIP5 multi-model ensemble displayed as violin plot; the median and 551 
interquartile ranges are indicated with horizontal dark gray lines). See Table 1 for more details.  552 
 553 
Figure 3: Possible outcomes with respect to global temperature and regional climate anomalies from typical 554 
1.5°C-warming and 2°C-warming compatible scenarios in 2100. Top: Net GtCO2 emitted by 2100 relative to 555 
2016 (including carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere) in considered scenarios from Table 1 556 
(25thquantile (q25), median (q50), and 75th quantile (q75)). 2nd row: Global mean temperature anomaly in 2100 557 
(q25, q50, q75). 3rd-5th row: Regional climate anomalies at peak warming compared to the pre-industrial period 558 
corresponding to the median global warming of the 2nd row (full range associated with different regional 559 
responses within CMIP5 multi-model ensemble displayed as violin plot; the median and interquartile ranges are 560 
indicated with horizontal dark gray lines). See Table 1 for more details. 561 
 562 
Figure 4: The stochastic noise and model-based uncertainty of realized climate at 1.5°C. Temperature with 563 
25% chance of occurrence at any location within 10-year time frames corresponding to Tglob=1.5°C (based on 564 
CMIP5 multi-model ensemble). The plots display at each location the 25th percentile (Q25, left) and 75th 565 
percentile (Q75, right) values of mean temperature (Tmean), yearly maximum day-time temperature (TXx), 566 
yearly minimum night-time temperature (TNn), sampled from all time frames with Tglob=1.5°C in RCP8.5 567 
model simulations of the CMIP5 ensemble. 568 
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ΔT = 1.5°C (CMIP5 ensemble)
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